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in the request of the Senator from Minnesota.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the remaining committee amendments, beginning on page 2, line 7, and extending through line 8 of page 4.

The amendments were agreed to. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, as I understand, the agreement is that the Senator from Arkansas may have whatever time is available to the Senator from Minnesota.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the understanding of the Chair.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Does that mean that when the Senator from Arkansas has concluded, the Senate will resume consideration of the pending bill under the time limitation contained in the unanimous-consent agreement?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

### "THE UGLY AMERICAN"

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as everyone knows, a book may sometimes create a pattern of thinking or a viewpoint among a people. It may be a good book or an inferior one, true or false, veracious or venal. It may be helpful to the Nation or harmful to it.

Chief among recent books to attract the point of view of many Americans concerning our conduct of foreign relations and the men who conduct them in the field is "The Ugly American," by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick.

Messrs. Lederer and Burdick have directed a stream of oversimplified and sensational criticism at the directors of our program of foreign aid in southeast Asia. This does a number of harmful things simultaneously. It heartens those Americans who detest foreign aid and who use these criticisms as an argument for the abandonment of such aid to Asian countries. It coarsely brushes aside the extraordinary, delicate, and novel complexities of the immense problem of Asian foreign aid. And it hinders a serious, unemotional examination of the manner in which aid should be handled.

"The Ugly American" is fiction.

This book was written as fiction—

The authors say. Then they add: But it is based on fact.

This, I take it, means that a fictional book ought not be regarded as fiction, but as fact. And the authors, anxious to parade fiction as fact, conclude their book with a 15-page "factual" epilog. Here they outline what they consider to be the "facts" about our foreign-aid activities in southeast Asia and the men who carry on the work there. But in this so-called factual epilog the authors of a book about the concrete subject of foreign aid nowhere make it clear that they are substituting fiction for fact.

According to the authors of "The Ugly American" if only our officers in the field took their advice, they would become personally popular and their country would wield great political power. That is, if our foreign aid officials should become backslappers, baby-sitters, and all around good fellows, the influence of the United States would increase over the vast reaches of the Pacific. More than that, our officials and authors who are apparently unable to tackle anything but truth, by exposing serious inaccuracies how our foreign aid officials can greatly help the United States in Asia. Here are a few points from the epilog for success stories in Laos and Sumatra:

First. Our diplomats ought to be able to speak French, Cambodian, Vietnamese, and other extraordinarily difficult languages of southern Asia. It does not matter to our all-knowing authors that these languages, while difficult to acquire, are spoken by relatively small numbers of people and are of no value elsewhere in Asia or in the world to the man who might have acquired them only through years of work. Neither does it matter that Congress persistently refuses to give the State Department enough money to provide adequate language training.

Third. Our diplomats would also be better off if they stopped getting drunk. This reckless charge is not documented presumably because our authors are intent upon showing that theirs is indeed a work of fiction.

Fourth. If our diplomats left the cities for the villages, they would do better. We are told, although how and why they would do better is not convincingly stated. Neither is it stated how a diplomat can carry on business with a government—which is his job—if he is in a village and the government is in the capital city. It would make as much sense to say that an ambassador to the United States ought to forsake Washington for Pocatello, Idaho.

Fifth. It would also be helpful to the general cause, one learns, if our foreign representatives were all missionaries and technicians instead of what our authors scornfully call bureaucrats.

Sixth. Much improvement to Asia and the United States would ensue if our representatives devoted themselves to breeding better chickens instead of constructing roads, dams, and irrigation works.

Seventh. But the greatest good would flow from one thing—if only our technicians in the fields would remove themselves to the villages, renounce personal sanitation, and live in disease-infected areas under disease conducive conditions so that they would become weakened by dysentery, their wives riddled by fever, and their children doomed to a sickly childhood or death.

Eighth. While living in the villages, during bouts of fever, the technicians, say our authors, could do a number of useful things that would enable them partially to earn their keep. They could describe to the local people the evils of communism and the beauties of democ-

cracy, read the books our enemies have written telling us in plain Russian or plain Chinese just how they intend to destroy us, and all the while conduct a 24-hour alert against them.

This is the recommended recipe for winning without risk to our side. It is one more way up to the authors' goal of a world of peace, freedom, and mastery of international politics.

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Finally, and especially, the book contains that which we are engaged in a political struggle for which we have neither talent nor the will to win and indeed find it impossible to win and disastrous to ensure. Only one course is open to us. That is to abandon the whole thing. Hence, "The Ugly American" is actually a panic-stricken American in a political retreat from a job that he finds too tough to handle.

If this is a false and shameful conclusion to a false and in many ways shameful book, it is an incredible conclusion because of the basic contradiction of the book's title, namely that while written as fiction but presumably based upon the facts of life, the facts and title do not agree.

Nowhere in the so-called factual epilog do the authors give us the source of their so-called facts. Nor do they state it is intended to prove the numerous charges they make against our aid program in southeast Asia. Their sole stated source are two. One is a quotation from the New York Times. One is an excerpt from a speech by the late Secretary of State Dulles.

In only one place do the authors attempt to explain the national conditions under which one of their own heroes moves. This man is named Tom Knox. He is a national chicken expert in Indonesia and our authors apparently seem to believe that the road to American success in southeast Asia is paved with chickens. Chickens, seem, indeed, to obsess them. In any event, the chicken expert Tom Knox, for reasons never stated, is a man of such consequence to us that the French go to great pains to corrupt him.

The Tom Knox story is accompanied by a curiously arrogant statement on the part of the authors.

We tried to point out—

They say— the fact that we spend billions on the wrong aid projects while overlooking the almost countless and far more helpful ones. Most American technicians are involved in the planning and execution of projects: dams, highways, irrigation systems.

Who said the projects are wrong? Why none other than Lederer and Burdick. This is their opinion and they are certainly entitled to express it; but if they are serious about it, they ought also to try to document it instead of letting it stand as nothing but a dogmatic